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MX Under Fire 
In early July, Defense Secretary Weinberger 
plans to announce the Administration's posi-
tion with regard to the MX missile project, 
following receipt of an independent panel's 
report on the subject. The decision presum-
ably will involve two major policy issues:  1) 
whether the Administration will support con-
tinued development and eventual full-scale 
production of  this new generation missile, 
and 2) if so, which system it favors for basing 
and deployment of  the new nuclear weapon. 
The decision will have enormous implica-
tions for the nation's long-term security pos-
ture. It also could have momentous 
economic, environmental and social conse-
quences for the two regions which are being 
considered as possible base sites: Utah/ 
Nevada and Texas/New Mexico. 
Security argument 
Although it is now reviewing all options, the 
Reagan Administration to date has apparently 
conti  nued its predecessor's su pport for de-
velopment and testing of  the MX missile. It 
included in its proposed fiscal 1982 budget 
the $2.9 billion requested by the Carter Ad-
ministration to continue engineering de-
velopment and to begin launch-site construc-
tion. But the Administration thus far has been 
unwillingto commit itself  to a specific basing 
mode for the MX. In fact, even some of the 
staunchest critics of a land-based system of 
deployment favor the missile's development 
on national-security grounds, although with 
some other basing method. 
The nation's strategic nuclear-deterrent 
forces consist of a three-part land-sea-air 
arsenal. This "Triad" includes land-based in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM's) and long-range bombers. The land-
based ICBM portion of the Triad consists of 
1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan missiles 
housed in fixed underground silos. 
Until recently, most U.S. defense officials 
considered the nation's strategic nuclear 
forces to be invulnerable to a preemptive 
(first) Soviet attack. They believed that those 
forces could absorb a surprise first-strike at-
tack and still retain a sufficient number of 
deliverable warheads to inflict unacceptable 
retaliatory damage on the attacking nation. 
They believed also that the Soviet Union was 
similarly invulnerable. Thus, according to the 
concept of mutual deterrence, if both sides' 
strategic nuclear forces remained mutually 
invulnerable, then no rational government 
wou  Id be tempted to start a nuclear war. 
But during the past several years, the Soviet 
Union has been developing a force of large, 
more accurate ICBM's, each capable of car-
rying several powerful nuclear weapons 
(mu Iti pie warheads). As a resu It of  these tech-
nological improvements-introduced by the 
United States but more widely implemented 
by the Soviets-U.S. military officials fear 
that the Soviet Union will soon be capable of 
destroying 90 percent of the present u.s. 
land-based missile force. 
The loss of  the Minuteman force would not 
mean the loss of  the entire U.s. retaliatory 
capability, in view of  the strength of  the sea-
borne and airborne components of the Triad. 
But both Congress and the Administration 
fear the growing vulnerability of  the Minute-
man force. Both branches apparently are 
committed to the development and eventual 
production of a new generation missile. The 
MX's first flight test is scheduled for 1983, 
with regular production of the missile 
scheduled to begin in 1986. But this leaves 
unresolved the question of  where to base the 
individual missiles, each of which will mea-
sure 92 inches in diameter and 71  feet in 
length, and weigh 192,000 pounds. 
land-base option 
The Carter Administration (and the Air Force) 
favored the multiple protective structure 
(MPS) concept, which would call for the con-
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Accessible from each roadway would be 23 
concrete shelters, housing one genuine MX 
missile and 22 high-quality facsimiles. The 
system altogether would include 4,600 
shelters, each capable of housing and pro-
tecting a single missile launcher-which 
means that any potential enemy wou  Id have 
to use at least 4,600 warheads to destroy the 
real 200 MX missiles. 
Official esti mates place the cost of  the system 
at around $50 billion in 1980 dollars-by far 
the biggest public-works project in history. 
Each shelter would be a reinforced-concrete, 
steel-lined cylinder buried under five feet of 
earth, with exposed concrete and steel doors. 
Concrete enclosures for electrical power, 
communications, control and other equip-
ment would be buried adjacent to each shel-
ter. The system thus would require ~bout 
400,000 tons of steel and about 1.5 million 
tons of cement, plus about 8,500 miles of 
new road construction. The construction 
phase would cover roughly eight years, be-
ginning in early 1982. 
The U.S. Air Force favors a 12-county area in 
Nevada and Utah as the site for the MX 
system. Under its "Proposed Action," it 
would place a main operating base at Coyote 
Spring Valley north of Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and a smaller base near Milford, Utah. In its 
environmental-impact report on deployment 
area selection, however, the Air Force listed 
six different basing options involving 
Nevada/Utah sites (see map). A seventh al-
ternative called for placing bases at Clovis, 
New Mexico and Delhart, Texas. An eighth 
option-the "split-basing" alternative-
would place one operating base in each re-
gion at Coyote Spring Valley, Nevada and 
Clovis, New Mexico. 
Impact of "Proposed Action" 
Basing of the MX system in the Nevada/Utah 
area would strongly affect the regional 
economy according to the environmental-
impact statement. 
Employment: At the peak of project activity 
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around 1986, an estimated 30,000 persons 
would be directly employed as construction 
workers, equipment-assembly personnel, 
and operating-base workers. About 13,000 
permanent workers would operate the bases 
after completion of the construction phase. 
During construction a total of about 52,000 
jobs would be created, directly and in-
directly, as a result of project spending and 
procurement from local suppliers. Con-
sequently, the region could expect a decline 
in unemployment, wage escalation, and 
worker shortages. In the same fashion, as 
many as 19,000 long-term jobs might be 
created directly and indirectly in the post-
construction phase. Clark County, Nevada 
(site of  the larger base) would experience the 
greatest impact. In both Clark County and 
Beaver County, Utah (site of the smaller 
base), an expanded demand for services and 
a large increase in land values would ac-
company rapid growth. 
Population: Even without construction of  the 
MX system, population growth would prob-
ably accelerate in the 12-county impact area, 
to about a 3.2-percent annual rate in the 
1983-87 period, reflecting Utah's high birth 
rate and the strong expansion of mineral and 
energy activities within the region. With MX, 
in contrast, the growth rate could reach 4.5 
percent annually during the 1983-87 period, 
and then fall to a 1.1-percent rate from 1988-
91. But the rural communities near the 
operating bases could experience annual 
growth rates as high as 45 percent during the 
construction period, followed by a steep 
decline. 
Housing: The environmental-impact state-
ment assumes that construction workers 
would live in a set of construction camps, 
with barracks-type housing in remote !Jarts of 
the impact area. But in addition, about 
20,000 housing units would be needed for 
their families and other workers. It further 
assumes that over one-half of  those latter 
housing units would be located in Clark, Salt 
Lake and Utah counties-metropolitan areas 
capable of providing those housing facilities with less stress than if  they were built i'n the 
rural areas closer to the bases. Even then, the 
housing impact would be very significant for 
certain areas; for example, housing growth in 
Beaver County, Utah could triple by the peak 
year of the project. The report also ac-
knowledges that housing requirements 
would drop after 1987, leaving a surplus. It 
assumes that most surplus units would be 
mobile homes that could be relocated out of 
the region. 
Groundwater availability: The annual 
recharge-groundwater capacity of most val-
leys in Nevada and Utah is now "fully ap-
propriated," which means that the  water 
table would be reduced by the demands of 
the MX construction project. Thus, the 
Moapa Reservation's irrigation-water supply 
near Coyote Spring Valley would be affected 
unless water could be purchased and 
pumped from Las Vegas or acquired from 
other users. Water for the Mi  Iford base prob-
ably would have to be purchased from exist-
ing agricultural users, which could remove 
20,000 acres from irrigated farm use. 
Criticism of project 
The Air Force report has drawn a barrage of 
criticism from state commissions and resi-
dents of Nevada and Utah -and recently 
even from the Mormon Church leadership. 
Critics charge that the report understates the 
vast impact the MX project would have on 
local communities, by concentrating on the 
project's overall impact on the entire 12-
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county "region of influence." Moreover, it 
fails to take account of  the high-growth ac-
tivities already taking place in adjacent areas, 
such as the development of synthetic fuels 
and the development of  new supplies of  min-
erals and fossil fuels. Farmers and ranchers 
also fear that their activities could be affected 
by reduced water availability, withdrawals of 
grazing land, and a consequent decline in 
livestock production. Most of all, critics 
charge that the report gives inadequate atten-
tion to the project's impact on the social and 
natural-resource  environment,  including 
education, health and public-safety, services, 
transportation, air quality, soil erosion, vege-
tation and animallife~ 
Most critics would prefer to see some other 
basing method for the MX project, such as the 
Smallsub Undersea Mobile (SUM) system. 
This system would deplpythe MX from a fleet 
of  small non-nuclear submarines operating in 
coastal waters off the continental United 
States and Alaska, with an MX capsule at-
tached outside the hull of  each small sub. 
(That program would benefit the shipbuilding 
industry in the West.) Other alternatives 
would include basing the MX in other types of 
silos, on merchant ships, or on various types 
of aircraft. But the Air Force argues that all 
these options would jeopardize a fundamen-
tal principle of u.s. strategy-the Triad. In 
any event, a decision seems likely soon on a 
project which will clearly affect the future 
economy of the Intermountain West. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 




























5/27/81  Dollar  Percent 
- 154  11,840  8.6 
53  11,478  9.9 
190  4,086  12.1 
23  5,535  11.8 
- 7  - 1,044  - 4.4 
- 31  547  52.6 
- 60  130  2.1 
- 41  236  1.5 
1,159  - ~,446  5.5 
1,137  - 2,260  - 7.3 
331  3,107  11.4 
596  16,735  26.0 
748  16,485  29.9 
69  9,246  41.0 
Weekended  Comparable 
5/27/81  year-ago periOd 
n.a.  82 
148  10 
n.a.  72 
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